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The electricity industry is rapidly changing: costs are increasingly dominated by capital and technology is
turning loads into resources. This is similar to the early days of the Internet. Building on rate-structures used in
the communications industry, utilities of the future should oﬀer customers a portfolio of service contract options
that provide a signal to the utility regarding the type and amount of infrastructure that should be deployed.

1. Introduction
The rapid growth of variable wind and solar generation, along with
cheap natural gas and stagnant demand growth, have led to substantial
declines in wholesale electricity prices, to levels not seen in two decades
or more. Wholesale cost declines have not been reﬂected in retail prices
because of increasing ﬁxed costs and the costs associated with state
electricity programs. Retail el ectricity costs are increasingly driven by
the capital costs associated with replacing aging transmission and distribution infrastructure and building new wind, solar, natural gas and
(increasingly) energy storage capacity. Fixed costs are becoming a
larger fraction of customers’ bills.
This trend can be clearly seen in recent wholesale and retail prices
in the PJM Interconnection, which serves much of the Mid-Atlantic U.S.
(see Fig. 1). In this region, stagnant electricity demand and cheap
natural gas have led to signiﬁcantly lower wholesale costs. Growth in
renewable energy in the region and growth in demand response have
also been factors. Despite a 25% decline in wholesale energy and capacity costs, retail prices in several states within PJM have actually
increased. The widening gap between retail and wholesale prices is due
in large part to the growth in state-level customer charges. The increase
in state tariﬀ costs are driven by a number of factors, including capital
for transmission and distribution, and programs that support renewable
and low-carbon energy.
A second notable trend is the emergence of new enabling technology for ﬂexible demand. The potential value of demand-side ﬂexibility has been recognized for decades (Morgan and Talukdar, 1979;
Schweppe et al., 1980). In order to test this value, many utilities

implemented direct load control programs that used timers or radio
broadcast signals to remotely disconnect loads during peak periods.
However, these legacy programs could not guarantee customer quality
of service, reducing customer adoption rates, and were narrowly limited to providing peak reduction services. The potential value of these
types of programs, particularly in a system with large amounts of
variable renewables, has declined as the sophistication of automated
grid-connected devices has increased. New smart thermostats and load
coordination software systems can enable aggregated grid edge devices,
such as water heaters, pool pumps, and HVAC thermostats, to provide
grid services that are very similar to that provided by grid-scale battery
systems. When employed eﬀectively, grid services from these distributed energy resources can balance the variability of wind and solar
generation and eliminate or defer the need for new capital investment
for grid assets.
In an electricity system where capital represents a large fraction of
electricity costs and marginal operating costs are approaching zero, the
historical models for both wholesale and retail pricing of electricity are
being increasingly challenged (among the many recent pieces on this
topic include Faruqui et al., 2016; Frew et al., 2016; RAP, 2017; Bielen
et al., 2017; NARUC, 2016). It is increasingly clear that ﬂat volumetric
electricity rates with small ﬁxed charges are insuﬃcient to align consumer incentives with the costs that electric utilities face. The availability of new technology means that we are no longer constrained to
work with simplistic ﬂat rate structures. The ideal electricity rate
structure would encourage customers to engage in behaviors that are
beneﬁcial to the system as a whole. Neither ﬂat volumetric tariﬀs nor
rates that depend on dynamic pricing accomplish this goal in a

⁎

Corresponding author.
E-mail address: paul.hines@uvm.edu (P. Hines).
1
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of their employers.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2019.02.010

Available online 04 March 2019
1040-6190/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).

The Electricity Journal 32 (2019) 39–43

H. Lo, et al.

periodically according to a set of rules, based on grid and market
conditions. Here we review several of the most common dynamic rate
structures.
The most common dynamic rate is a time of use (TOU) structure
with pre-deﬁned peak and oﬀ-peak prices over ﬁxed and pre-determined time intervals. Utilities have used TOU rates for years, and the
literature is fairly clear that these rates do produce some load shifting
between peak hours and oﬀ-peak hours (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010).
The TOU is, however, a blunt tool with several shortcomings.
The ﬁrst shortcoming from simple TOU pricing is that rates are set
based on historical diurnal patterns of peak and oﬀ-peak demand, under
the assumption or determination that peak demand is more expensive
to serve. As the technologies that supply electricity change, these historical deﬁnitions of ‘high cost on-peak’ and ‘low cost oﬀ-peak’ are
increasingly breaking down. Under a TOU rate, there are many days in
which customers would be paying the higher peak rate when there are
no active capacity constraints, so that the marginal cost of energy is
relatively low (for example, due to high wind power production). In
these cases, an optimal solution from the perspective of the system as a
whole is to increase demand by doing useful work, such as charging
electric vehicles or turning on water heaters. Similarly, the combination
of variable wind and solar and unexpected transmission or generation
conditions can result in capacity constraints outside of normal peak
hours. In engineering terms, TOU rates cannot solve a dynamic control
problem because the rate structure is an “open loop” solution.
A more signiﬁcant challenge is the impact of automation. Consider
the model of a future California power system considered by
Cammardella et al. (2018), in which millions of devices such as thermostats, water heaters, refrigerators and pool pumps participate in a
time-of-use program with peak hours in the early evening. If these loads
were set on a simple timer, they would consume no electricity during
the peak hours and then would turn on full blast as soon as the oﬀ-peak
time period begins. One million residential water heaters alone could
produce a 4 GW spike in load. If TOU adoption were suﬃciently high,
this load spike could substantially increase wholesale market prices and
overwhelm transmission, distribution and generation assets during the
hour after the oﬀ-peak rate starts, potentially oﬀsetting any gains made
from load reductions during the peak price hours.
What if the loads are equipped with something smarter? If the
control devices were designed to optimally control the loads and to
preserve customer quality of service, one would get a load spike before
the event as the smart devices prepare for the event, load reduction for
a fraction of the peak period, and then a second load spike at the end of
the event (Fig. 2 shows one example). The result is two new demand

Fig. 1. PJM wholesale costs and some residential retail rates in PJM’s market
footprint. Source: Author calculations using data from PJM (wholesale cost and
load data) and the Energy Information Administration (state average retail
prices).

changing power grid where energy is nearly free (at the margin) and a
the components of the grid have a high degree of automation. We believe that any ﬁnancial engagement between the utility and consumers
should be designed to do the following:

• Encourage customers to shift demand to times when capacity constraints are not binding.
• Encourage new uses of electricity that leverage under-utilized capacity.
• Promote equity and aﬀordable energy access for low- and moderateincome electricity customers.
• Provide a clear signal from customers to electric utilities regarding
•
•
•
•

the amount and type of infrastructure capacity that customers actually want the utility to build, rather than reﬂecting the average
costs of historical utility decisions.
Allocate costs, beneﬁts and risks equitably, fairly and transparently
among customers.
Minimize surprises and unintended consequences (such as cost shift
and/or unplanned rate increases) by applying a systematic, methodical, holistic and portfolio approach to rate design
Promote performance-based competition between traditional grid
infrastructure and DER investment decisions to keeps rates aﬀordable (unleash load as a resource systematically and at scale)
Integrate DER solutions as an extension of grid infrastructure for
planning, operation and optimization to minimize stranded cost and
maximize economic value of DER investments

If retail electricity rates could meet these goals, overall costs would
go down and aﬀordable, reliable decarbonization would be easier (e.g.,
by changing volumetric rates that discourage electriﬁcation), providing
beneﬁts for everyone. Moreover, by harnessing the inherent ﬂexibility
of many electric loads, the utility can shape overall consumption to
both reduce costs and greatly simplifying planning processes.
The questions that we address in this paper are what kind of rate
structure will best achieve these aims, and how can power systems
engineering be adapted to ensure that consumers experience no negative impact even when they are oﬀering signiﬁcant ﬂexibility to the
grid.

2. Existing dynamic rate structures and their challenges

Fig. 2. The optimal response of millions of air conditioners, water heaters,
refrigerators and pool pumps to a 90-minute increase in electricity price, given
quality of service guarantees (Cammardella et al., 2018). The resulting fast load
ramps could become a major headache for grid operators, and many loads are
not able to hold their response through long events.

While ﬂat volumetric rate structures continue to be common in
practice, utilities have tested a wide range of alternative approaches.
Most of these use some form of dynamic pricing, in which prices change
40
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Many loads are also storage devices. The most obvious are water
heaters or homes in the winter in cold climates that store (thermal)
energy. Power arriving to the water heater is extremely bursty – a typical unit in the U.S. draws over 4 kW for 5 min, and is then oﬀ for
several hours; yet the water remains within comfortable bounds. The
behavior of residential heating and cooling systems is similar. Other
deferrable loads that behave like batteries include water pumping (for
irrigation or pool cleaning), and even “cow cooling” in locations with
dairy farms. Translating this ﬂexibility into virtual energy storage that
is reliable and controllable like a battery system requires careful control
systems design. Nevertheless, we believe it is no more diﬃcult than the
control challenges faced in the early days of the Internet. In our own
research, distributed control algorithms have been developed to provide battery-like grid services, while maintaining strict bounds on the
quality of service oﬀered to consumers. In fact, these algorithms were
motivated in part by Internet control architectures (Almassalkhi et al.,
2018; Chen et al., 2018).
There are of course social and economic challenges. Even if the
consumer is assured that the new smart water heater will provide hot
water just like the old one, and the smart thermostat will keep temperature within strict bounds chosen by the occupant, getting customers to adopt economically beneﬁcial ﬂexible demand systems requires
very clear economic incentives and clear communication about the
beneﬁts of technology adoption.
New technology that enables ﬂexible demand to act as fully controllable energy storage resources opens up new operational possibilities. More eﬃcient operations could feed into less costly planning
decisions if capacity congestion can be reliably avoided during operations. Rate design, however, will need to encourage this symbiosis in
capacity congestion control. Electric rates cannot simply be a backward-looking feedback mechanism, in which utilities learn about
whether previously made planning decisions were suﬃcient, but can
become a mechanism that improves future planning decisions. These
ongoing changes give the utility a unique opportunity to engage with
customers in system planning.

peaks at the beginning and the end of the event period, two periods of
rapid load ramping, and load reductions that only persist through the
ﬁrst part of the high-priced period. This behavior is clearly suboptimal
from both an economic and a power engineering perspective.
An alternative to the TOU rate is to use a critical peak price (CPP) or
peak time rebate (PTR) structure in which the retail price of electricity
increases substantially when there are capacity shortages, or customers
earn rebates by reducing their consumption during critical peak time
periods. These structures have been shown to (at least initially) reduce
peak consumption by 5–40% for customers that adopt these rates
(Faruqui et al., 2017). Our own experience with critical peak rate pilots
(Blumsack and Hines, 2015; Bleything et al., 2015) shows that: (a) CPP
responses are not particularly reliable from one event to the next, (b)
that customers were frequently confused about how much they were
saving (or not saving), and (c) customers were not clear about what
actions they could take to make a real diﬀerence in their consumption.
CPP rates were an eﬀective measure to encourage peak-shifting among
customers who stick with them. Our study, however, showed customers
opting out of the CPP rate at a fairly high frequency. Increased automation could make these rates more palatable for consumers, but as
with the TOU rate, one may still end up with load spikes before and
after event periods end, and responses that do not persist through the
entire peak period.
Another alternative is real time pricing (RTP), in which hourly or
sub-hourly wholesale prices are passed along to homes, businesses and
devices. RTP is a closed-loop strategy that addresses one of the shortcomings of TOU rates. Some have argued that consumers will be insulated from risk through automation, but as is the case with TOU rates,
automated responses to variable prices in a closed-loop system can
produce outcomes that are bad for both consumers and the grid. There
is growing evidence that passing wholesale prices to automatically
controlled devices could result in system-wide instabilities that could
increase volatility, rather than decrease it (Callaway and Hiskens,
2011).
Perhaps most importantly, these time-varying rate structures were
designed to align retail costs with periods of peak demand. The goal of
the rate design was to avoid the use of high-cost peaking plants, to defer
or eliminate the need for capital upgrades, or both. A time varying
volumetric rate does not address the cost-recovery problem in a system
where cost is dominated by capital rather than fuel. When capacity is
the primary driver of cost, customer rate choices should provide a
signal to utilities about how much demand there is for new capacity in
the future, rather than merely passing the historical and regulator-approved average of capital and operating costs back to customers. In
other words, electric rates of the future need to be forward-looking,
providing a signal to utilities regarding what investments and kinds of
service customers want, rather than merely looking back at the cost
implications of the system investment decisions that the utility and
their regulators or stakeholders have worked out among themselves.

4. An alternative: service contracts, not rates
In order to ﬁnd a plausible alternative to dynamic rates, we again
look to the telecommunications industry. Consider, for example, cellular telephone service. As is increasingly the case with electricity, the
cellular industry faces very low marginal costs and very high capital
costs with constraints that become binding only during peak periods.
These peak periods are sometimes hard to predict in advance. Very few,
if any, providers actually attempt to pass on the time-varying cost of
usage to customers. Instead, the industry as a whole oﬀers a range of
contract structures and consumers choose the combination of reliability
and capacity that ﬁts with their lifestyle. For example, in the US one can
buy a fairly reliable high-bandwidth contract for $100/month from a
major cellular service provider or a very low bandwidth, low reliability
contract from a pay-as-you-go provider for as little as $100/year. In
reality, both plans run on the same physical networks, but the infrastructure owners oﬀer their surplus capacity to the lesser-known service
providers at a discounted cost, and then throttle back their bandwidth
(leading to less reliable service) when capacity is constrained. Based on
customers’ willingness to pay for the more expensive plans from
mainstream providers, infrastructure owners get a clear signal regarding how much infrastructure to build. Similarly, Internet service
providers sell monthly service contracts with prices that vary not with
the total volume of internet usage, but rather with the amount of capacity (bandwidth) that the customer would like to purchase.
Obviously, it would be foolish to reproduce the structure of telecommunications pricing exactly. There is some evidence that existing
structures in telecommunications lead to market power that is not good
for consumers. But the service contract structure provides a useful guide
for reform of retail rate structures in electricity.

3. Congestion control and automation
Until the end of the 1980s, balancing supply and demand in the
Internet appeared to be an intractable problem: the consumer wants
bandwidth, and the more the better. The complexity of the congestion
control problem appeared insurmountable. It was recognized early on
that a distributed control architecture was needed. Initial attempts
failed, leading to a colossal collapse in 1986 in California, which inspired in part the seminal work surveyed in Jacobson (1988). The reliability of communication networks today is the result of a distributed
control architecture that began with this early work.
Along with distributed control (local intelligence and automation
across the network), communication networks require buﬀers to help
balance supply and demand. In the power grid, this is analogous to
storage (e.g. batteries or dams) along with inertia from large spinning
generators.
41

The Electricity Journal 32 (2019) 39–43

H. Lo, et al.

were actual capacity constraints on the grid.

Our suggestion is that electric utilities design a portfolio of service
contracts that allow customers to choose plans that align with they
desire, value and can aﬀord. We have identiﬁed several diﬀerent dimensions along which these service contracts could be diﬀerentiated.

4.1. Addressing challenges
We acknowledge that the concept of forward-looking, system-based
portfolio of service plans calls for a paradigm shift from current practices. But this paradigm shift is necessary if our industry is to decarbonize and enter an era of zero marginal cost grid. Given the ambitious carbon reduction goals that many US states and countries have set
into policy, it is not too early to consider what paradigm shifts are
necessary. The time between today and the arrival of zero marginal cost
electricity is the runway that we have to identify a revenue model that
can be operationalized at scale. Reﬁning the service contract rate
structure will require systematically identifying and mitigating concerns and risks. Once concerns, risks and mitigation strategies are
identiﬁed pilot studies will be needed to validate and reﬁne the assumptions underpinning service contract model. Once the revenue
model is de-risked, validated and rigorous, utilities will need to develop
implementation strategies and execution plans to ensure a smooth
transition, so that customers are not shocked or disadvantaged by
sudden changes.
The following are three particular examples of the kinds of rate
design challenges that will require careful thinking.
First, electricity and electric rates are already fairly confusing to
many customers (Blumsack and Hines, 2015). The service plan concept
should not make this worse. Utilities would need to strike the right
balance between the number of service plan options and the granularity
of those options. Too few options will not give customers opportunities
to express meaningful preferences and give planning signals to the
utility, while too many options will overwhelm many consumers.
Second, utilities would need to perform careful analysis in order to
structure and price service plans correctly. Some attributes of the kinds
of service plans we propose would yield diﬀerent service costs and
savings depending on the number of people who sign up for those plans.
Pricing service contracts and making investments based on the number
of customers that are expected to sign up has the potential to yield
stranded costs or revenue shortfalls if those enrollment projections are
oﬀ by substantial margins. For example, we envision oﬀering consumers a lower service plan rate (other things being equal) if they agree
to a high level of automation and demand ﬂexibility. This lower service
plan rate reﬂects the system beneﬁt of avoiding high capacity utilization during peak periods. Such a system beneﬁt, however, would
probably decline as the amount of demand ﬂexibility increases.
Suppose that the utility prices service plans with automation assuming
that perhaps 25% of customers would enroll in such a plan. Now suppose that 90% of customers enroll in the automation plan but are rewarded (with a lower service plan cost) based on the projected system
beneﬁt from 25% enrollment. This revenue would need to be made up
from somewhere, necessitating the kind of cost recovery or cross-subsidization mechanism that the service plan model seeks to minimize in
the ﬁrst place.
The way in which consumer choice is structured would also need to
be carefully considered, particularly if service plan subscriptions are
used by the utility as an input to planning decisions. Many utility investments are long-lived, and the traditional business model depends on
being able to charge customers for those investments over a long period
of time. (It also depends on treating customers as if they care about
reliable kilowatt-hours and nothing else.) There is thus some risk of
stranded costs if customers are allowed to change service plans frequently and without penalty. This is not fundamentally diﬀerent than
the demand-side risk that utilities face currently, but the utility would
need to think carefully about how to manage it. Flexibility in demand
may come with a service plan discount, but ﬂexibility in choice of
service plans would likely need to come with some penalty to avoid the
risk of stranded costs being widely socialized.
Third, utilities will also need to develop mechanisms for enforcing

• Capacity or service level: What is the minimum amount of power
capacity that the customer needs during times of grid congestion?
• Automation: How much demand automation technology is the
•
•
•
•

customer interested to install and how much ﬂexibility is the customer willing to oﬀer to the system through demand management?
Carbon intensity: How much additional carbon reduction (beyond
regional policy goals) does the customer want?
Local generation: To what extent does the customer want to buy
only from local power producers?
Low income: What level of low-income subsidy is appropriate for
this customer?
Nano-grid: Does the customer only want to use the grid as a last
resort backup to their own rooftop solar and battery system?

The concept of replacing volumetric or other rate designs with ﬁxed
price service plans has been mentioned before in the literature (see,
e.g., Huber and Bachmeier, 2018), as a mechanism to shift risks and
enable consumers to express preferences for diﬀerent levels of service.
We argue that the need for service contracts goes beyond these advantages mentioned by Huber and Bachmeier. As the problem of
managing capacity congestion becomes more central to utility operations and the potential for automation expands, the service contract
rate design becomes the easiest way to align customer preferences with
their costs of service.
When customers make choices about capacity and automation, they
signal to the utility the extent to which they are willing to have loads
automatically curtailed during periods of system congestion and the
amount of ﬁrm capacity that the utility should build to support this
customer’s service. For those customers who desire to have a lower
carbon footprint than the portfolio that is currently available, or what is
required by regulation and legislation, they can choose an option that is
less carbon intensive or even net zero. For those who want to support
local economic development they can choose an option with a higher
contribution from nearby generation sources. Clearly, there should also
be a service contract structure for low-income customers to mitigate
inequity and ensure energy access. The design and pricing of the lowincome package should be informed by existing and future policies
around low income and disadvantage communities. For those who have
onsite solar and battery systems and thus only need the grid as a backup or to supplement their own generation, there should be a package
that is appropriate for them as well. Based on these diﬀerentiators, we
should be able to design a portfolio of service contract options that best
ﬁt the needs and desires of the customers, within their budget constraints. By choosing service contracts, customers would give the utility
a forward price signal regarding the level of service that the utility
should plan for and the environmental attributes that they value.
For an illustrative example, a utility could oﬀer a budget plan that
would have strict upper limits on customers’ peak load, which would be
enforced only during periods of capacity shortages, and coupled with
automation technology that helps customers to minimize the impact on
quality of service for their most critical loads. Or customers could
purchase a premium plan, with a higher monthly capacity charge and
volumetric rates, with virtually no limits on capacity (as with most
standard ﬂat rates today). Or customers could purchase an advanced
automation plan that combined an intermediate capacity limit with a
wide range of home automation services that would assist the customer
in staying within this limit. Since energy is not yet free and volumetric
rates do have some eﬃciency beneﬁts, the rate would most likely include both a monthly charge and volumetric element. Unlike with
conventional rates that use a demand charge, capacity limits would
only be enforced (ﬁrst by engaging dispatchable demand) when there
42
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communicate the costs and beneﬁts of service options in clear ways.

the contracts that customers choose, particularly for the capacity limit
element of a service contract. If a customer were unable to keep their
load under their demand limit during periods of congestion (perhaps
due to insuﬃcient automation technology), there would need to be
some feedback to the customer. Both the pricing models used in telecommunications service and some current practices in electricity retailing oﬀer some potential solutions to the enforcement problem.
Overage charges and service throttling in telecommunications are both
common (if irritating when levied) consequences for over-use that
allow the network provider to align costs with service intensity. Electric
utilities in Oklahoma and providers in Texas (Eryilmaz and Gaﬀord,
2018) have been experimenting with prepaid electric use, which also
features overage charges. In any situation, clear communication with
customers is key.
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4.2. Beneﬁts
The beneﬁts of the service plan structure to the load serving entity
are most obvious: a service plan model can be designed to address the
signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs in this industry, the utility will face less uncertainty regarding infrastructure needs, and the proposed technology
component will ensure that demand ﬂexibility is provided without
unexpected negative impact on the consumer. And with a portfolio of
data about customer service contract choices, the utility should have
substantially better data from which to evaluate generation, transmission and distributed energy (non-wires) infrastructure solutions on their
relative merits. If well implemented this approach could enable utilities
to integrate, operationalize and scale DERs as part of their normal
planning, operation and optimization activities. Enabling utilities to
make better tradeoﬀs among wires and non-wires alternatives should
provide beneﬁts to a broad range of stakeholders, including (most importantly) electricity customers.
The value to the consumer is realized through the shared beneﬁt of
lower infrastructure costs, lower stranded risks and a better way for
consumers to signal the kinds of services that they want. Utilities in
California today are rapidly building billion-dollar battery systems and
supporting infrastructure. These costs could be reduced dramatically
with demand-side management, implemented autonomously to eliminate risk to the consumers. In particular, customer bills will be more
predictable, relative to complicated dynamic pricing schemes, and grid
services from typical retail loads will provide precisely what is expected
of them.
5. Conclusions
Retail rate structures need to adapt to ongoing fundamental changes
in the cost structure for electric power provision, as well as fundamental changes in the interaction between customers and the power
grid. As renewable energy grows, cost structures become more capitalintensive and historically predictable diﬀerences between peak and oﬀpeak marginal costs disappear. Increased automation brings terriﬁc
potential for the use of end-use appliances for grid balancing and stability, but these technologies are only beneﬁcial if the equivalent of
herd behavior can be avoided. The twin challenges of cost recovery and
harnessing technical potential for a lower-cost and more eﬃcient power
system are unlikely to be entirely solved through wholesale market
innovations. Since they are challenges that ultimately aﬀect end-user
bills, the way that utilities think about rate-making will need to radically evolve.
We argue that a fundamental shift towards utility rates as cost recovery mechanisms and towards a value-of-service philosophy (Harmon
et al., 2009) is the right approach. Utilities should think carefully about
how to move beyond the volumetric charge paradigm and towards a
system that charges for what customer’s value. We do not claim that the
design of appropriate service rates will be easy. A great deal of research
will be needed to understand what customers really value, and how to
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